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________________________________________________________________ 
LEGISLATION AND REPORTS 
 
SECTION 47 OF THE ENTERPRISE AND REGULATORY REFORM ACT 2013:  
A FLAWED REFORM OF THE UK CARTEL OFFENCE 
 
Dr Peter Whelan 
 
On 1 April 2014, sHFWLRQRIWKH(QWHUSULVHDQG5HJXODWRU\5HIRUP$FWµ(55$¶HQWHUHGLQWR
force, ensuring significant changes to the criminal UK Cartel Offence. That particular criminal offence, 
contained in section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002, was enacted in order to secure the deterrence of 
cartel activity affecting the UK. Following almost ten years of its enforcement, the Cartel Offence had 
failed to live up to its expectations. Consequently, following a public consultation it was reformed in 
substance. As a result of sHFWLRQ(55$WKHFRQWURYHUVLDOGHILQLWLRQDOHOHPHQWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶KDV
EHHQUHPRYHGIURPWKHRIIHQFHDQXPEHURIµFDUYHRXWV¶IURPWKHRIIHQFHKDYHEHHQFUHDWHGDQGWKUHH
additional defences now exist. This article examines in detail the specific reforms of the Cartel Offence 
and argues that, although considerable improvement has been made, the UK authorities currently have 
at their disposal a criminal offence that is fundamentally flawed and unworkable in practice. Further 
reform is therefore advised. 
 
Keywords: cartels; criminal enforcement; defences; dishonesty; Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013; UK Cartel Offence 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
7KHFRQFHSWRIµFDUWHODFWLYLW\¶UHIHUV WR WKHPDNLQJRU LPSOHPHQWLQJRIDQDQWLFRPSHWLWLYH
agreement, concerted practice or arrangement by competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids, 
establish output restrictions or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or 
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lines of commerce.1 Cartel activity is generally perceived to be harmful to society in that it 
reduces competition in the marketplace to the detriment of consumers.2  The potential effects 
of cartel activity include an increase in prices for consumers, a reduction in output, quality and 
LQQRYDWLRQDQGWKHH[LVWHQFHRIµGHDGZHLJKWORVV¶LHDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHFRQVXPHUVZKRZRXOG
have purchased goods at the competitive price are unable to purchase those goods at the 
cartelised price). EU law prohibits cartel activity which has an effect on trade between the EU 
Member States: Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
µ7)(8¶:KLOHDVDUHVXOWRI$UWLFOH7)(8DQH[FHSWLRQWRWKHSURKLELWLRQLQ$UWLFOH
101(1) TFEU is legally possible (provided strict criteria are fulfilled),3 it is very unlikely to be 
provided in practice for cartel activity.4 In fact, the European Commission, in enforcing the 
cartel prohibition, regularly imposes large (administrative) fines on companies. Importantly, it 
cannot impose criminal sanctions (such as custodial sentences) on individuals.5 That said, EU 
law does not prohibit the EU Member States themselves from enforcing the cartel prohibition 
in Article 101(1) TFEU (or indeed any cartel prohibition in their own national laws) through 
individual criminal sanctions, including imprisonment.6 In fact, some Member States do 
enforce (EU and national) competition law through personal criminal sanctions.7 
                                                 
1
 2UJDQLVDWLRQIRU(FRQRPLF&RRSHUDWLRQDQG'HYHORSPHQWµ2(&'¶µ5HFRPPHQGDWLRQRIWKH2(&'&RXQFLO
&RQFHUQLQJ(IIHFWLYH$FWLRQ$JDLQVW+DUG&RUH&DUWHOV¶0DUFK&ILQDO>D@ 
2
 S. Bishop and M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), 163.  
3
 See Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette SA v Commission [1994] ECR II-595. 
4
 See, eg: European Commission, Xth Report on Competition Policy, Brussels, 1980, [115]; Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to Certain Categories of Research and Development Agreements [2010] OJ 
L335/36, Article 5(1); and Commission Regulation (EU) No 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the Application 
of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Certain Categories of Specialisation 
Agreements [2010] OJ L335/43, Article 4(1). 
5
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition 
Laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty >@2-/KHUHDIWHUµ5HJXODWLRQ¶$UWLFOH 
6
 See, eg: Regulation 1/2003, Articles 5 and 12(3); P. Whelan, The Criminalization of European Cartel 
Enforcement: Theoretical, Legal, and Practical Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 144-145; 
DQG : :LOV ,V &ULPLQDOL]DWLRQ RI (8 &RPSHWLWLRQ /DZ WKH $QVZHU"¶ LQ . &VHUHV 03 Schinkel, and F. 
Vogelaar (eds), Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement: Economic and Legal Implications for the EU 
Member States (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), 90-92. 
7
 6HHHJ02¶.DQHThe Law of Criminal Cartels: Practice and Procedure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 325-327. 
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In the UK a (statutory) criminal offence centred on the concept of cartel activity has 
been in existence for a number of years: the UK Cartel Offence. In 2001, following a public 
consultation on the issue,8 the UK Government decided to introduce a criminal Cartel Offence 
LQWR ODZ LQRUGHU WRFUHDWHD µUHDOGHWHUUHQW¶ FRQFHUQLQJFDUWHO DFWLYLW\9 The Enterprise Act 
µ($¶ZDVSDVVHGLQZLWKWKHUHOHYDQWVHFWLRQFRQWDLQLQg the UK Cartel Offence coming 
into effect on 20 June 2003.10 Accordingly, under section 188 EA (as originally drafted), it is 
a criminal offence for an individual to dishonestly make or implement or cause to be made or 
implemented a cartel agreement between horizontal competitors. A cartel agreement in this 
context is confined to agreements relating to price-fixing, market or customer sharing, output 
restrictions and bid-rigging. The Cartel Offence is a stand-alone offence which does not require 
proof of a violation of Article 101(1) TFEU.11 Although the Cartel Offence has been on the 
UK legislative books for more than ten years, to date there has only been two successful 
criminal prosecutions of this offence (both of which were obtained via guilty pleas on behalf 
of the defendants).12 The only other prosecution of this offence ended in an embarrassing 
failure when, due to issues concerning disclosure of evidence, the Office of Fair Trading 
µ2)7¶KDGWRRIIHUQRHYLGHQFHDWWULDO13 7KH2)7¶VHIIRUWVWRenforce the UK Cartel Offence 
have been subjected to considerable criticism,14 ZLWKPDQ\LQDJUHHPHQWWKDWµenforcement has 
                                                 
8
 Department of Trade and Industry, A World Class Competition Regime, Cm 5233, July 2001. 
9
 Department of Trade and Industry, µ3URGXFWLYLW\ DQG (QWHUSULVH ± $ :RUOG &ODVV &RPSHWLWLRQ 5HJLPH¶
*RYHUQPHQW¶V5HVSRQVHWR&RQVXOWDWLRQ, December 2001, 20-24. 
10
 s 188 EA. On the UK Cartel Offence, see generally: M. Furse, The Criminal Law of Competition in the UK and 
in the US: Failure and Success (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), Chapter 4; and A. Mac&XOORFKµ7KH&DUWHO
2IIHQFH,V+RQHVW\WKH%HVW3ROLF\"¶LQ%5RGJHUHGTen Years of UK Competition Law Reform (Dundee: 
Dundee University Press, 2010). 
11
 0)XUVHDQG61DVKµ3DUWQHUVLQ&ULPH7KH&DUWHO2IIHQFHLQWKH8.¶(2004) 15(5) ICCLR 138, 141. 
12
 See: R v Whittle and others [2008] EWCA Crim 2560 (involving three convicted defendants); and R v Snee, 
Southwark Crown Court, 17 June 2014 (involving one convicted defendant). 
13
 R v Burns and others, Unreported Judgment, Southwark Crown Court, 10 May 2010.  See generally: OFT, 
µ2)7:LWKGUDZV&ULPLQDO3URFHHGLQJVDJDLQVW&XUUHQWDQG)RUPHU%$([HFXWLYHV¶2)73UHVV5HOHDVH
10 May 2010, http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2010/47-10#.Uf57LCBwbIU; and N. Purnell, C. 
%HOODP\1.DU'3LFFLQLQDQG36DKDWKHYDQ3µ&ULPLQDO&DUWHO(QIRUFHPHQW± More Turbulence Ahead? 
The Implications of the BA/Virgin &DVH¶(2010) 9(3) Competition Law Journal 313.   
14
 6HH HJ 0 )XUVH µ7KH 1HZ &DUWHO 2IIHQFH ³*UHDW IRU D +HDGOLQH %XW 1RW 0XFK (OVH"´¶  
(XURSHDQ&RPSHWLWLRQ/DZDQG--RVKXDµShooting the Messenger: Does the UK Criminal Cartel Offense 
+DYHD)XWXUH"¶[August 2010] Antitrust Source 1. 
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some way to go before criminal sanctions against individuals will appear to be an active 
GHWHUUHQW¶15  
Given this context, it was no real surprise when the UK Government recently conceded 
that enforcement of the Cartel Offence had been ineffective and that legislative change was 
required in order to reform the Cartel Offence so that it would become fit for purpose.16 Two 
of the major changes decided upon by the UK Government were the removal of the 
µGLVKRQHVW\¶HOHPHQWIURPWKHRIIHQFHDQGWKHDGGLWLRQDOQDUURZLQJRIWKHRIIHQFHE\GHILQLQJ
LWµVRWKDWLWGRHVQRWLQFOXGHFDUWHODUUDQJHPHQWVWKDWWKHSDUWLHVKDYHDJUHHGWRSXEOLVKLQD
suitable IRUPDWEHIRUHWKH\DUHLPSOHPHQWHGVRWKDWFXVWRPHUVDQGRWKHUVDUHDZDUHRIWKHP¶17 
On 23 May 2012, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill - the Bill that contained inter alia 
WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V UHIRUPV RQ WKH &DUWHO 2IIHQFH - had its first reading in the House of 
Commons. By 25 April 2013, when this Bill received the Royal Assent and became an Act of 
Parliament, it contained a number of additional (controversial) reforms to the Cartel Offence, 
such as the creation of three specific defences to this offence: section 47 of the Enterprise and 
5HJXODWRU\ 5HIRUP $FW  µ(55$¶ ZKLFK FDPH LQWR IRUFH RQ  $SULO  7KHVH
additional reforms received no treatment in the public consultation and their consideration in 
the Parliamentary debates was scant at best. Moreover, it is arguable that, while some of the 
reforms should be welcomed by those who wish to see effective enforcement of cartel law in 
the UK, one of the new defences in particular has the potential to undermine completely the 
effectiveness of the UK criminal cartel regime and should never have been enacted. 
This article intends to engage with this particular debate. More specifically, it aims to 
analyse critically the recent reform of the UK Cartel Offence and, in doing so, evaluate whether 
the legislative changes in section 47 ERRA are supportable and/or whether future, additional 
reform is warranted. The article is divided into three substantive sections and a conclusion. The 
first section examines the originally drafted UK Cartel Offence and its inherent defect, allowing 
one to highlight the mischief that the recent reform aimed to rectify. The inherent defect 
identified is the inclusion within the originally drafted Cartel Offence of the definitional 
HOHPHQWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶ The next section considers the public consultation on the UK Cartel 
                                                 
15
 (0RUJDQµ&ULPLQDO&DUWHO6DQFWLRQVXQGHUWKH8.(QWHUSULVH$FW$Q$VVHVVPHQW¶International 
Journal of the Economics of Business 67, 81. 
16
 See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on 
Options for Reform0DUFKKHUHDIWHUµWKH&RQVXOWDWLRQ'RFXPHQW¶&KDSWHU 
17
 See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Growth Competition and the Competition Regime: 
Government Response to Consultation, March KHUHDIWHUµ)LQDO5HSRUW¶ 
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Offence, the various proposals considered in the context of that consultation, and the legislative 
outcome of the consultation (viz., section 47 ERRA). The final section analyses, critically and 
in detail, the reforms contained within section 47 ERRA. Taken together these three substantive 
sections allow the author to present his conclusions that: (a) although some improvements have 
been made, the UK authorities currently have at their disposal a criminal cartel offence that is 
fundamentally flawed and unworkable in practice; and (b) further reform of section 188 EA is 
therefore advised. 
 
THE ORIGINAL UK CARTEL OFFENCE AND ITS INHERENT DEFECT: THE DEFINITIONAL 
ELEMENT OF µ'ISHONESTY¶ 
 
Prior to the reforms of section 47 ERRA, section 188(1) EA provided that an individual would 
EHJXLOW\RIDQRIIHQFHLIVKHµGLVKRQHVWO\DJUHHVZLWKRQHRUPRUHRWKHUSHUVRQVWRPDNHRU
LPSOHPHQWRUWRFDXVHWREHPDGHRULPSOHPHQWHG¶DFDUWHODUUDQJHPHQW between at least two 
horizontal competitors. Essentially, the cartel arrangement in question must be one which, if 
operating as the parties intend, would involve: fixing the prices of a product or service supplied 
to a third party; limiting or preventing the supply of a product/service or the production of a 
product; the dividing of markets or customers; or bid-rigging.18 A person found guilty of this 
offence is liable, on summary conviction, to a maximum term of six months imprisonment 
and/or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum19 and, on conviction on indictment, to a 
maximum term of five years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine.20 
The primary rationale behind the creation of the UK Cartel Offence, with its focus on 
the above-noted cartel arrangements, was the deterrence of cartel activity.21 As noted by 
Hughes LJ, there 
 
is no doubt whatever that [the Cartel Offence] was created because it was thought to provide a 
stronger deterrent to [anticompetitive practices] to threaten executives with imprisonment than 
was achieved by threatening undertakings with civil financial penalties, heavy as the latter may 
often be.22 
                                                 
18
 See Enterprise Act 2002, s 188(2).   
19
 ibid s 190(1)(b). 
20
 ibid s 190(1)(a). 
21
 $0DF&XOORFKµ+RQHVW\0RUDOLW\DQGWKH&DUWHO2IIHQFH¶ECLR 355, 355. 
22
 R v IB [2009] EWCA Crim 2575 at [22]. 
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Sole reliance upon (administrative) fines on companies in order to deter cartel activity was seen 
as being ineffective, in particular because the optimally-deterrent firm-focused fine would be 
disproportionate and would produce unacceptable social costs (eg, the liquidation of the 
infringing company).23 In addition, criminal sanctions aimed at individuals responsible for 
cartel activity were viewed as advantageous in achieving deterrence as they would µsend out a 
strong message to the perpetrators, their colleagues in business, the general public, and the 
FRXUWV¶.24 In coming to these conclusions, the Government was persuaded by the experience of 
WKH$QWLWUXVW'LYLVLRQRI WKH86'HSDUWPHQWRI -XVWLFH µ'R-¶ LQ LWV HIIRUWV WR HQIRUFH WKH
federal US prohibition on cartel activity in section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 through the 
imposition of criminal (custodial) sanctions upon convicted individuals.25 Importantly, the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VGHWHUUHQFH-based) support for the existence of criminal cartel sanctions can still 
be rationalised on the basis of economic deterrence theory and the most recent empirical 
evidence concerning the operation of cartels (eg, their effects, duration, and chances of 
avoiding detection and prosecution).26 This fact arguably provides a relatively solid 
explanation as to why the Government (and the relevant prosecutorial agencies) remained 
committed to the UK Cartel Offence even in the face of considerable criticism regarding its 
enforcement in practice (and obvious resistance to cartel criminalisation in other EU Member 
States).27 
 Although the primary rationale for the existence of the Cartel Offence is undeniably 
deterrence, the criminal justificatory theory of retribution also played a part in its creation. In 
particular, cartel activity was not prohibited in a per se manner: only dishonest cartel activity 
was criminalised. A two-part test to be used to determine µdishonesty¶ was set out in R v 
Ghosh.28 Although Ghosh concerned the Theft Acts,29 the test for µGLVKRQHVW\¶ contained 
                                                 
23
 See Department of Trade and Industry, A World Class Competition Regime, Cm 5233, July 2001, [7.13]-[7.16].   
24
 HC Deb vol 383 col 47 10 April 2002 (Patricia Hewitt MP). 
25
 See, eg, OFT, 7KH3URSRVHG&ULPLQDOLVDWLRQRI&DUWHOVLQWKH8.ʊ$5HSRUW3UHSDUHGIRUWKH2IIice of Fair 
Trading by Sir Anthony Hammond KCB QC and Roy Penrose OBE QPM, OFT 365, November 2001, [1.3]. 
26
 6HHHJ*:HUGHQµ6DQFWLRQLQJ&DUWHO$FWLYLW\/HWWKH3XQLVKPHQW)LW WKH&ULPH¶ European 
Competition Journal 19; and Whelan, n 6 above, Chapter 3. 
27
 6HHHJ%,6µ)LQDO5HSRUW¶>@DQG>@ 
28
 R v Ghosh [1982] 2 All ER 689, 696.   
29
 2QWKHOLQNEHWZHHQFDUWHODFWLYLW\DQGWKHIWVHH3:KHODQµ&DUWHO&ULPLQDOL]DWLRQDQGWKH&KDOOHQJHRI0RUDO
:URQJIXOQHVV¶OJLS 535. 
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therein has in fact been deemed to be of general application in the criminal law of England and 
Wales.30 Unsurprisingly then, the case of R. v George and others expressly established that the 
Ghosh WHVWDSSOLHGWRWKHGHILQLWLRQDOHOHPHQWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶FRQWDLQHGLQWKHRULJLQDO&DUWHO
Offence.31 Accordingly, both subjective and objective analyses are required: the conduct must 
be (a) dishonest according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people and (b) 
known by the defendant to be dishonest according to those standards. 
:KLOVW LW LV DUJXHG EHORZ WKDW WKH µGLVKRQHVW\¶ HOHPHQW LV DQ LQKHUHQW GHIHFW LQ WKH
(original) Cartel Offence, one can nonetheless identify various explanations for the 
employment of the concept of µGLVKRQHVW\¶in that offence. )LUVWWKHXVHRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶VLJQDOV
WKDWWKHRIIHQFHLVDµVHULRXV¶RQH32 Second, the courts might be more likely to impose custodial 
sentences if the underlying criminal offence that had been committed was one involving the 
µGLVKRQHVW\¶RIWKHFRQYLFWHGLQGLYLGXDOV33  7KLUGWKHXVHRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶UHIOHFWVthe desire of 
the legislature to underline the moral wrongfulneVVRI WKHFDUWHOLVW¶VEHKDYLRXU µdishonesty 
appropriately captures the genuinely criminal nDWXUH RI VHULRXV FDUWHO FRQGXFW¶.34 By 
criminalising dishonest cartel activity, the legislature is sending out the message that some 
types of cartel activity are in fact dishonest (otherwise criminalisation would be pointless), and 
WKHUHIRUHµZURQJ¶LQDPRUDOVHQVH&RPPXQLFDWLQJWKLVPHVVage not only helps the legislature 
WR DYRLG FODLPV RI µRYHUFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ EXW DOVR DLGV WKH OHJLVODWXUH DQG WKH DQWLWUXVW
authorities) to create and/or to reinforce a moral norm concerning cartel activity.35 In creating 
and/or reinforcing such a moral norm, the authorities are creating potential for the 
internalisation of that norm and thus for its self-enforcement. If successful, such internalisation 
can reduce the costs inherent in enforcing the criminal cartel offence. Fourth, it was argued that 
the dHILQLWLRQDOHOHPHQWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶ZRXOGµUHGXFH WKH OLNHOLKRRG WKDWFRQYLFWLRQZRXOG
GHSHQGRQMXGJPHQWVWDNHQRQGHWDLOHGHFRQRPLFHYLGHQFH¶36 The concern here was that juries 
would not be able to understand fully such economic evidence. An offence that does not require 
                                                 
30
 R v Lockwood [1986] Crim LR 244. 
31
 R. v George and others [2010] EWCA Crim 1148. 
32
 OFT, n 25 above, [2.5]. 
33
 ibid [1.11]. 
34
 3&RVWHOORµ&ULPLQDO3HQDOWLHVIRU6HULRXV&DUWHO%HKDYLRXU¶3UHVV5HOHDVHIURPWKH7UHDVXUHURI$XVWUDOLD
February 2005. 
35
 6HH3:KHODQµ,PSURYLQJ&DUWHO(QIRUFHPHQWLQWKH8.7KH&DVHLQ)DYRXURI%,6¶V³2SWLRQ´¶
8(3) European Competition Journal 589. 
36
 BIS, Consultation Document, [6.9]. 
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FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIHFRQRPLFHIIHFWVLHDQRIIHQFHEDVHGRQµGLVKRQHVW\¶UDWKHUWKDQDQHFRQRPLF
impact in a market) would therefore be preferable. Finally, and in possible contradiction to the 
SRLQW PDGH GLUHFWO\ DERYH µGLVKRQHVW\¶ ZDV Dlso employed as a means of ensuring 
compatibility with Article 101(3) TFEU and/or section 9 of the Competition Act 1998 without 
having to define the Cartel Offence in a manner that expressly links the offence to those 
provisions.37 It is submitted that there is indeed scope for the Ghosh test to carve out from the 
UK Cartel Offence cartel activity that would benefit from an exception under UK or EU law: 
the defendant could indeed argue that the conduct would not have been unlawful under UK or 
EU competition rules and that, ipso facto, she would not have fulfilled the first part of the 
Ghosh test (as reasonable and honest people may well come to the conclusion that there is 
nothing dishonest in cartel activity that is legitimate according to the cartel law rules in 
operation within the UK).38 7KH FRQFHSW RI µGLVKRQHVW\¶ WKHQ FDQ EH XQGHUVWRRG DV D
definitional construct that can be employed to ensure that the criminal cartel offence does not 
FULPLQDOLVH µOHJLWLPDWH¶ RU µDFFHSWDEOH¶ FDUWHO DFWLYLW\39 (eg, the type of (very rare) cartel 
activity that may be capable of generating net efficiencies for consumers40). 
Irrespective of the alleged merits of the UK approach, it was anticipated that the use of 
µdishonesty¶ in the definition of the (original) Cartel Offence ZRXOGUHSUHVHQWDµVLJQLILFDQW
challenge¶ IRU SURVHFXWRUV.41 In fact, there are sound theoretical and legal reasons why the 
HPSOR\PHQWRIWKHGHILQLWLRQDOHOHPHQWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶LQWKHRULJLQDO&DUWHO2IIHQFHZRXOG
be problematic.42 Stephan succinctly summarises one of the main problems: 
                                                 
37
 See: MacCulloch, n 21 above, 356; and OFT, n 25 above, [2.5]. 
38
 Cf C. 'REELQDQG&3HUHW]µ7KH&DUWHO2IIHQFH¶LQ7:DUGDQG.6PLWKHGVCompetition Litigation in the 
UK (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), 182. 
39
 See Whelan, n 6 above, Chapter 8. 
40
 For examples of this type of cartel activity, see: Case COMP/36.748, Reims II, Commission Decision, 15 
September 1999, [1999] OJ L275/17; and Case COMP/29.373, Visa International ± Multilateral Interchange Fee, 
Commission Decision, 24 July 2002, [2002] OJ L 318/17.  
41
 6 %ODNH µ&ULPLQDO DQG &LYLO &DUWHO (QIRUFHPHQW ,VVXHV DQG &KDOOHQJHV IRU $GYLVRUV DQG $XWKRULWLHV ± 
3HUVSHFWLYHRIWKH$XWKRULW\¶(2008) 7(1) Competition Law Journal 9, 12. 
42
 See gHQHUDOO\%)LVVHµ7KH&DUWHO2IIHQFH'LVKRQHVW\"¶Australian Business Law Review 235; C. 
+DUGLQJDQG--RVKXDµ%UHDNLQJ8SWKH+DUG&RUH7KH3URVSHFWVIRUWKH3URSRVHG&DUWHO2IIHQFH¶>@Crim 
LR --RVKXDµ'2$&DQWKH8.&DUWHO2IIHQFHEH5HVXVFLWDWHG"¶ in C. Beaton-Wells and A. Ezrachi 
(eds), Criminalising Cartels: A Critical Interdisciplinary Study of an International Regulatory Movement 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011); and P. Whelan, µ/HJDO &HUWDLQW\ DQG &DUWHO &ULPLQDOLVDWLRQ ZLWKLQ WKH (8
0HPEHU6WDWHV¶&LJ 677.  
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>L@W ZDV WKRXJKW WKDW LQFRUSRUDWLQJ WKH PRUDO HOHPHQW RI µGLVKRQHVW\¶ LQWR WKH >8. &DUWHO
Offence] would harden public attitudes. However, this has not happened in the absence of 
regular convictions and may be problematic because dishonesty necessitates a contemporary 
moral judgement on the part of the jury and therefore relies on attitudes being sufficiently 
hardened in the first place.43 
 
,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHXVHRIWKHGHILQLWLRQDOFRQVWUXFWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶HQJHQGHUVDSUREOHPRIWKH
µFKLFNHQDQGHJJ¶YDULHW\RQHZLVKHVWRKDYHFULPLQDOSURVHFXWLRQVWRKDUGHQDWWLWXGHVWRFDUWHO
activity; but by arguing that cartel activity is dishonest (according to the standards of honest 
people), one in effect presupposes the existence of such hardened attitudes. According to the 
available (limited) empirical evidence, it seems that hardened attitudes to cartel activity do not 
currently exist in the United Kingdom.44 
An additional issue with the originally-drafted UK offence concerns its adherence to 
the principle of legality.45 As a result of Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
µ(&+5¶, a criminal offence must be clearly defined in law; it must be possible to 
predetermine, if necessary with legal advice, what conduct is criminal and what conduct is not 
VROHO\E\UHIHUHQFHWRWKHODZ$UWLFOH(&+5µLPSOLHVTXDOLWDWLYHUHTXLUHPHQWVQRWDEO\WKRVH
RIDFFHVVLELOLW\DQGIRUHVHHDELOLW\¶46 It is arguable that the (original) Cartel Offence does not 
meet this standard.47 The argument runs as follows. The Cartel Offence is conceptually distinct 
from the cartel prohibitions in Article 101 TFEU and in Chapter 1 of the Competition Act 1998. 
One can violate section 188 EA without violating Article 101 TFEU, as the former provision 
(unlike the latter) does not require an effect on trade between Member States and does not 
                                                 
43
 A. Stephan, µ/DPH'XFNRU%ODFN0DPED&DQWKH8.&DUWHO2IIHQFH(QKDQFH'HWHUUHQFH"¶(65&&HQWUH
for Competition Policy Working Paper 08-19, November 2008, 
www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/public¢les/workingpapers/CCP08-19.pdf, 32. 
44
 See A. 6WHSKDQµSurvey of Public Attitudes to Price-)L[LQJDQG&DUWHO(QIRUFHPHQWLQ%ULWDLQ¶
Competition Law Review 123. For similar (albeit Australian-focused) literature, see, eg, C. Beaton-Wells, F. 
Haines, C. Parker and C. Platania-3KXQJµ5HSRUWRQD6XUYH\RIWKH$XVWUDOLDQ3XEOLF5HJDUGLQJ$QWL-Cartel 
/DZDQG(QIRUFHPHQW¶0HOERXUQH/DZ6FKRRO'Hcember 2010 (where it was found that less than a majority of 
those surveyed believed that cartel conduct should be criminalised, with less than a quarter believing 
imprisonment to be an appropriate sanction). 
45
 For an extended analysis of this issue, see Whelan, n 42 above. 
46
 SW and CR v United Kingdom (1996) 21 EHRR 363, 399. 
47
 6HHHJ63DUNLQVRQµ7KH&DUWHO2IIHQFHXQGHUWKH(QWHUSULVH$FW¶Company Lawyer 187. 
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provide an exemption for agreements which meet the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
One can violate section 188 EA without committing an administrative offence under Chapter 
1 of the Competition Act 1998, as the latter also provides an exemption for agreements meeting 
certain strict criteria. Therefore when (in those admittedly rare cases) the cartel agreement 
fulfils the relevant exemption criteria, for example, it will not violate national or EU 
competition law. But, if by entering into the cartel agreement, the cartelist is deemed to be 
µGLVKRQHVW¶E\DMXU\WKHQshe will have committed a criminal offence (under the pre-ERRA 
offence). The legal certainty problem here is that the criminal offence (as originally drafted) 
does not have an actus reus which clearly points to criminality (in that the underlying conduct 
does not necessarily relate to a violation of national or EU competition law, for example) and 
WKDW WKH RQO\ JDXJH IRU FULPLQDOLW\ ZRXOG WKHUHIRUH EH WKH MXU\¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH
honest/dishonest nature of the underlying conduct, itself an inherently vague and uncertain 
concept.48 In short, as juries are the ones who decide what is or is not a dishonest practice, and 
as the potential cartelist does not have national or EU competition law to guide her, seeking 
legal advice on the criminality of her actions may not be as fruitful as she would have wished; 
hence the Article 7 ECHR-related problem. 
More problematically, it may be possible for defendants to advance dubious defences 
in the context of the analysis of µGLVKRQHVW\¶;49 the accused cartelists may allege, for example, 
that they were acting to protect employment or that they were acting in the best interests of 
some other category of person, such as shareholders.50 ,QGHHGIRU%ODFNµIHZSHRSOHSHUKDSV
will see anything dishonest in the practice where the purpose is to preserve jobs, and a vigorous 
HQWUHSUHQHXUPD\VHHQRWKLQJGLVKRQHVWLQLWLQDQ\FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶51 It has also been argued 
WKDW GHIHQGDQWV µPLJKW UHO\ RQ PLVWDNH RI ODZ DV D ZD\ RI GHQ\LQJ WKDW WKHLU FRQGXFW ZDV
GLVKRQHVW¶52 DQG WKDW WKHHOHPHQWRI µGLVKRQHVW\¶PD\ LQSUDFWLFH UHVXOW LQD UHTXLUHPHQW WR
waive professional privilege in order to demonstrate such a mistake, thus involving an 
                                                 
48
 See P. Whelan, µ3URWHFWLQJ +XPDQ 5LJKWV LQ WKH &RQWH[W RI (XURSHDQ $QWLWUXVW &ULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ in I. 
Lianos and I. Kokkoris (eds), The Reform of EC Competition Law: Towards an Optimal Enforcement System 
(Amsterdam: Kluwer International, 2010). 
49
 See: Harding and Joshua, n 42 above, 938; and MacCulloch, n 21 above, 362. 
50
 Parkinson, n 47 above, 189. See also Fisse, n 42 above, 262. 
51
 O. Black, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 128. 
52
 $*UD\µ&ULPLQDO6DQFWLRQVIRU&DUWHO%HKDYLRXU¶Queensland University of Technology Law and 
Justice Journal 364, 377. 
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unacceptable incursion into the rights of the defendant.53 Added to this is the very real 
possibility that there may be huge variations in what different people think amounts to 
dishonest behaviour.54 )RU-RVKXDLIWKHDLPRILQFOXGLQJWKHHOHPHQWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶ZLWKLQD
FDUWHORIIHQFHLVWRFRQILQHOLDELOLW\WRWKHPRVWVHULRXVFDUWHOVWKHQWKHFULWHULRQLVµHQWLUHO\
misconFHLYHG¶55 Beaton-Wells and Fisse are particularly sceptical of the appropriateness of 
XVLQJWKHFRQFHSWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRIFDUWHOFULPLQDOLVDWLRQDUJXLQJWKDWLW 
 
serves no useful purpose as an element of a cartel offence, is uncertain in meaning, creates 
avenues for unmeritorious denials of liability and, in terms of deterrence and public education, 
is false and misleading as a label or signal.56 
 
These problems and criticisms were deemed to be so acute that the Australian authorities 
eventually decided to abandon WKH XVH RI µGLVKRQHVW\¶ LQ WKHLU GUDIW57 criminal antitrust 
legislation.58 
 In addition, one should also note the inherent contradiction between two of the above-
LGHQWLILHG UDWLRQDOHV IRU HPSOR\LQJ WKH GHILQLWLRQDO HOHPHQW RI µGLVKRQHVW\¶ LQ WKH &DUWHO
Offence: (i) avoiding the presentation of complex economic evidence in front of a jury; and (ii) 
operationalising the exceptions in Article 101(3) TFEU and section 9 of the Competition Act 
1998. Hammond and Penrose argue, for example, that the employment of the definitional 
HOHPHQWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶ZRXOGµJRDORQJZD\WRSUHFOXGHDGHIHQFHDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHDFWLYLW\
EHLQJSURVHFXWHG«PLJKWKDYHHFRQRPLFEHQHILWVRULVDQDFWLYLW\ZKLFKPLJKWKDYHDWWUDFWHG
                                                 
53
 6HHHJ03LFNIRUGµ7KH,QWURGXFWLRQRID1HZ(FRQRPLF&ULPH¶(2002) 1(1) Competition Law Journal 35, 
38.  
54
 6HH HJ 6 &RQQRU µ6H[HV 'LIIHU 2YHU 'LVKRQHVW\ 6D\V 1HZ 6WXG\¶ The Guardian, 7 September 2009, 
GLVFXVVLQJWKHµ+RQHVW\/DE¶UHVHDUFKFRQGXFWHGE\)LQFKDQG)DILQVNL 
55
 Joshua, n 42 above, 1422QWKLVVHHDOVR%)LVVHµ7KH&DUWHO2IIHQFH'LVKRQHVW\"¶Australian 
Business Law Review 235, 241-DQG%)LVVHµ7KH$XVWUDOLDQ&DUWHO&ULminalisation Proposals: An Overview 
DQG&ULWLTXH¶Competition Law Review 51, 52-53. 
56
 C. Beaton-:HOOVDQG%)LVVHµ7KH$XVWUDOLDQ&ULPLQDO&DUWHO5HJLPH$0RGHOIRU1HZ=HDODQG"¶/HJDO
Studies Research Paper No. 413, Melbourne Law School, 2 August 2008, 1. 
57
 7KHGHILQLWLRQDOHOHPHQWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶RQO\DSSHDUHGLQGUDIWFULPLQDODQWLWUXVWOHJLVODWLRQLQ$XVWUDOLDVHH
Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Bill 2008 (Exposure Draft Bill, January 2008) 
(Australia), ss 44ZZRF and 44ZZRG. 
58
 On this, see Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other 
Measures) Bill 2008, Canberra, Australia, February 2009, [3.14]-[3.18].   
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exemption domestically or unGHU >(8@ ODZ¶59 %XW LI µGLVKRQHVW\¶ LV WR RSHUDWLRQDOLVH WKH
exceptions in Article 101(1) TFEU and section 9 of the Competition Act 1998, it will be 
necessary for the defendant to argue that ordinary people would not find that activity to be 
dishonest because it is not unlawful under EU/national competition law and in order to 
substantiate that argument the defendant will be required to put forward economic evidence 
which demonstrates the applicability of an exception under Article 101(3) TFEU (or the 
natiRQDOHTXLYDOHQW ,Q VKRUW WKHXVHRI µGLVKRQHVW\¶GRHVQRWSUHFOXGH WKHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI
complex economic evidence and may in fact encourage it if the defendant is serious about 
avoiding prison. This point has been acknowledged by a judge who was required to deliver a 
preliminary ruling in a UK Cartel Offence prosecution.60  
7KH UHDOLW\ WKHQ LV WKDW WKHHPSOR\PHQWRI WKHGHILQLWLRQDOHOHPHQWRI µGLVKRQHVW\¶
PHUHO\SURYLGHVDQRWKHUZD\IRUHFRQRPLFHYLGHQFH WREHXVHG WRFDUYHµDFFHSWDEOH¶FDUWHO
activity out of the criminal cartel offence. This is problematic for those who wish to see 
effective cartel enforcement in the UK: there is a strong argument that a central feature of an 
effective criminal cartel law is the absence of a requirement to analyse and to prove any 
economic effects in a market to find an infringement. There are three reasons for this. First, 
despite the robustness of the economic theory underlying the definition of a market,61 it can be 
notoriously difficult to establish the boundaries of a market in practice;62 and this is particularly 
the case when one must do so to a criminal standard of proof. Second, forcing criminal courts 
WR XQGHUWDNH FRPSOH[ HFRQRPLF DQDO\VHV µUXQV FRXQWHU WR RXU QRWLRQV RI WKH UHODWLYH
institutional competence of criminal courts as compared with a specialized administrative 
DJHQF\¶63 This issue can become particularly problematic when a jury (rather than a panel of 
                                                 
59
 OFT, n 25 above, [2.5]. 
60
 6HH$1LNSD\µUK Cartel Enforcement ± 3DVW3UHVHQW)XWXUH¶the Law Society Anti-Trust Section, London, 
'HFHPEHUZKRQRWHVWKDWWKHMXGJHLQTXHVWLRQµZDVSHUVXDGHGWKDWH[SHUWHFRQRPLFHYLGHQFHZDV
SRWHQWLDOO\ UHOHYDQW WR WKH LVVXH RI GLVKRQHVW\¶ In fairness to Hammond and Penrose, they do not say that 
µGLVKRQHVW\¶ZRXOGcompletely preclude the presentation of economic evidence. 
61
 See, eg, Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition 
Law [1997] OJ C372/5. 
62
 See, eg, A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 4th ed, 2011), 63. 
63
 P. Warner and M. Trebilcock (1992- µ5HWKLQNLQJ 3ULFH-)L[LQJ /DZ¶ -1993) 38(3) McGill Law 
Journal 2QWKHSUREOHPVHQFRXQWHUHGLQ&DQDGDZKHQSURVHFXWRUVKDGWRSURYHDQµXQGXH¶OHVVHQLQJ
RIFRPSHWLWLRQLQRUGHUWRLPSRVHFULPLQDOFDUWHOVDQFWLRQVVHH/-DFREVµ&ULPLQDO(QIRUFHPHQWRI$QWLWUXVW
Laws ± 3UREOHPV ZLWK WKH 86 0RGHO¶ LQ % +DZk (ed.), International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham 
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FULPLQDOMXGJHVLVUHTXLUHGWRUXOHRQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VEHOLHIDVWRWKHIXOILOPHQWRIHFRQRPLF
criteria in order to determine whether a criminal cartel offence has been made out on the facts 
as presented.64 )XUWKHUPRUHLWPD\LQMHFWDGHJUHHRILQFRQVLVWHQF\LQWRWKHODZDVLWµOHDYHV
open the possibility of inconsistent findings between criminal and civil proceedings arising as 
D UHVXOW RI GLIIHUHQFHV LQ HFRQRPLF MXGJHPHQW EHWZHHQ D OD\ MXU\ DQG D VSHFLDOLVW ³FLYLO´
WULEXQDO¶65 Third, by requiring economic assessments to be made in order to determine if a 
criminal cartel offence has been committed a criminalised jurisdiction would be creating a very 
fine ± and some may argue inappropriate - distinction between criminal conduct and non-
criminal conduct.66 Given the above, it seems that there is a solid argument that the employment 
of the definitional elemeQW RI µGLVKRQHVW\¶ LQ WKH RULJLQDO &DUWHO 2IIHQFH UHSUHVHQWHG D
significant inherent defect of that particular criminal offence. 
 
THE BIS CONSULTATION, ITS PROPOSALS AND THE RESULTING LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
 
The section directly above argued that the central difficulty with the original UK Cartel Offence 
LV LWV LQFOXVLRQ RI WKH GHILQLWLRQDO HOHPHQW RI µGLVKRQHVW\¶ )RU D QXPEHU RI LQIOXHQWLDO
commentators, the inclusion within the UK Cartel Offence of the definitional element of 
µGLVKRQHVWO\¶DJUHHLQJZLWKDQRWher to engage in cartel activity indeed proved to be too difficult 
for the OFT to overcome in practice, resulting in a relatively poor enforcement record.67 The 
UK Government was receptive to these criticisms of the original offence. In fact, in March 
2011, as part of a wider initiative aimed at reforming various elements of UK competition law, 
it set in motion a reform process concerning the UK Cartel Offence that would have its centre 
                                                 
Corporate Law 2006 (New York: Juris Publishing, 2007), 29; and S. 6FRWWµ&ULPLQDO(QIRUFHPHQWRI$QWLWUXVW
Laws: The US Model ± A Canadian Perspective¶ LQ Hawk, B. (ed.), International Antitrust Law & Policy: 
Fordham Corporate Law 2006 (New York: Juris Publishing, 2007), 70-71. 
64
 --RVKXDµ$6KHUPDQ$FW%ULGJHKHDGLQ(XURSHRUD*KRVW6KLSLQ0LG-Atlantic? A Close Look at the United 
.LQJGRP 3URSRVDOV WR &ULPLQDOLVH +DUGFRUH &DUWHO &RQGXFW¶  3(5) ECLR 231, 242. Cf P. Massey, 
µ&ULPLQDOLVLQJ&RPSHWLWLRQ/DZ2IIHQFHV± $5HYLHZRI,ULVK([SHULHQFH¶New Journal of European 
Criminal Law 153, 159.  
65
 Pickford, n 53 above, 43. 
66
 ibid 37. 
67
 6HH6%UDQFKµ(QIRUFHPHQW,QYHVWLJDWLRQV± 1RZDQG8QGHUWKH1HZ5HJLPH¶/DZ6RFLHW\(YHQLQJ6HVVLRQ
Competition Section, 2 July 2013, 15; and Nikpay, n 60 above, 19± 6HH DOVR $ 5LOH\ µ2XWJURZLQJ WKH
European Administrative Model? Ten Years of British Anti-&DUWHO(QIRUFHPHQW¶LQ%5RGJHUHGTen Years 
of UK Competition Law Reform (Dundee: Dundee University Press, 2010), 277. 
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WKH UHPRYDO RI WKH GHILQLWLRQDO HOHPHQW RI µGLVKRQHVW\¶ ,QGHed, in its 2011 Consultation 
Document (which considered many different aspects of the UK competition regime and not 
just its criminal enforcement VWUDQG%,6DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWWKHµGLVKRQHVW\¶HOHPHQWLQWKH
UK Cartel Offence was overly problematic and put forward four options for future reform, 
each one of which involved, inter alia, the removal of that particular definitional element.68 It 
ZDVIHDUHGWKDWWKHPHUHUHPRYDORIWKHµGLVKRQHVW\¶HOHPHQWZRXOGUHVXOWLQDQRIIHQFHWKDW
would be too broadly drawn; in particular, there was anxiety that the removal of that element 
µFRXOGPHDQWKDWWKHRIIHQFHZRXOGEHPRUHOLNHO\WRFDSWXUHVRPHIRUPVRIDJUHHPHQWWKDWDUH
capable of exemption under the antitrust prohibitions on the basis of their countervailing 
bHQHILFLDOHIIHFWV¶69  Thus none of the options for reform presented involved the mere removal 
RI µGLVKRQHVW\¶ UDWKHU HDFK DWWHPSWHG WR GHDO ZLWK WKH LVVXH RI RYHUUHDFK WKDW UHPRYLQJ
µGLVKRQHVW\¶IURPWKHRIIHQFHZRXOGDUJXDEO\HQJHQGHU 
 The first option for reform put forward in the Consultation Document involved the 
UHPRYDO RI WKH µGLVKRQHVW\¶ HOHPHQW DQG WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI SURVHFXWRULDO JXLGDQFH ZKLFK
would spell out the types of agreements that are most likely to warrant criminal investigation 
and proVHFXWLRQµ2SWLRQ¶7KHVHFRQGRSWLRQDUWLFXODWHGE\%,6LQYROYHGWKHUHPRYDORI
WKHµGLVKRQHVW\¶HOHPHQWDQGGHILQLQJWKHRIIHQFHLQDPDQQHUWKDWFDUYHVRXWDVHWRIµZKLWH-
OLVWHG¶DJUHHPHQWVGHILQHGE\W\SHDVRSSRVHGWRE\YLUWXHRIWKHLUHFRQRPLF HIIHFWVµ2SWLRQ
¶7KHWKLUGSURSRVDOLQYROYHGUHSODFLQJWKHµGLVKRQHVW\¶HOHPHQWZLWKDGHILQLWLRQDOHOHPHQW
FRQVWUXFWHGDURXQGWKHFRQFHSWRIµVHFUHF\¶µ2SWLRQ¶$SRWHQWLDOGHILQLWLRQIRUVHFUHF\LQ
this context was provided in paragraph 6.41 of WKH&RQVXOWDWLRQ'RFXPHQWµDQDJUHHPHQWPD\
be proved to have been made secretly where the persons who make the agreement take 
measures to prevent the agreement or the intended arrangements becoming known to customers 
RU SXEOLF DXWKRULWLHV¶ 7KH ILQDO RSWLRQ µ2SWLRQ ¶ QRWHG E\ %,6 LQYROYHG WKH UHPRYDO RI
µGLVKRQHVW\¶DQGWKHPRGLILFDWLRQRIWKHRIIHQFHVRWKDWDUUDQJHPHQWVPDGHRSHQO\GRQRWIDOO
within its scope. BIS noted in the Consultation Document that, subject to its consideration of 
the anticipated responses, it favoured the adoption of Option 4.70 
 It would be no exaggeration to state that the responses to the Consultation Document 
displayed significant opposition to the options for reform articulated therein. Interestingly, BIS 
noted in its FinaO5HSRUWWKDWZKLOHµ>E@XVLQHVVHVPHPEHUVRIWKHFULPLQDOODZEDUDQGODZ
                                                 
68
 6HH%,6µ&RQVXOWDWLRQ'RFXPHQW¶&KDSWHU 
69
 ibid [6.28]. See also the comments of Katja Hall in HC Deb vol 546 col 7 19 June 2012. 
70
 %,6µ&RQVXOWDWLRQ'RFXPHQW¶ 
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ILUPVZLWKFRPSHWLWLRQODZSUDFWLFHV«PRVWO\GLGQRWVXSSRUWWKHSURSRVHGFKDQJH¶RWKHUV
(such as the OFT, other prosecutors, overseas competition authorities, and a number of 
acDGHPLFV DQG VRPH PHPEHUV RI WKH FRPSHWLWLRQ EDU µJHQHUDOO\ IDYRXUHG UHIRUP¶71 The 
DYDLODEOHSXEOLFUHVSRQVHVKRZHYHUDUJXDEO\UHODWHDIDUEOHDNHUVWRU\2QWKLVDXWKRU¶VFRXQW
of the 115 publicly available responses to the Consultation Document (which, as already noted, 
contained quite a number of different proposals for the reform of the UK competition regime 
which were unrelated to criminal cartel enforcement), 49 commented on the reform of the UK 
Cartel Offence.72 Of these 49 respondents, only three actually expressed support for Option 4: 
the OFT; the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy; and the current author.  
2ISDUWLFXODULQWHUHVWJLYHQWKHFHQWUDOSRVLWLRQRIWKHGHEDWHRQµGLVKRQHVW\¶LVWKHIDFW
that 33 respondents believed that the case for WKH UHPRYDO RI µGLVKRQHVW\¶ KDG QRW EHHQ
adequately established. The primary reason for such a position was the fact that the Cartel 
Offence had not yet been tried in front of a jury: the alleged problematic nature of the 
GHILQLWLRQDOHOHPHQWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶KDVQRW\HWFRPHWROLJKWLQDFDVHWKDWZDVFRQWHVWHGLQ
WKHFRXUWV7KLVµZDLWDQGVHH¶DWWLWXGHLVVXPPHGXSFRQFLVHO\LQWKHIROORZLQJVXEPLVVLRQ 
 
[g]iven that no case has yet properly tested the role of the dishonesty element within the 
criminal cartel offence (and the current consultation admits as such in para. 6.15), we consider 
WKDWWKHUHLVQRFOHDUMXVWLILFDWLRQIRULWVUHPRYDO«)XUWKHUZHdo not consider that any useful 
precedents on this issue can be derived from the criminal cartel cases that have been brought 
to date: the Marine Hoses case resulted from plea bargain arrangements entered into by UK 
citizens detained in custody in the US which required the relevant individuals to plead guilty 
to the OFT indictment ± the dishonesty ingredient was not in that case required to be proved; 
the British Airways case, the difficulty of proving dishonesty was not a contributory factor to 
WKH2)7¶VGecision not to offer any evidence in that case.73  
 
$GGLWLRQDOUHDVRQVSXWIRUZDUGIRUNHHSLQJWKHµGLVKRQHVW\¶HOHPHQW LQFOXGHGWKHDUJXPHQW
that the Ghosh WHVWIRUµGLVKRQHVW\¶ZRUNVZHOOLQRWKHUOHJDOFRQWH[WV74 the fact that the small 
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number of Cartel Offence prosecutions could be due to factors other than the existence of the 
GHILQLWLRQDOHOHPHQWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶VXFKDVWKHXQGHU-resourcing of the OFT in relation to its 
criminal cartel enforcement role75 or the lack of cartels in existence that violate section 188 
EA76), the need to ensure that a strong link existed between the commission of the Cartel 
Offence and moral culpability or impropriety,77 and the need to ensure a distinction between 
the administrative cartel offence (under Article 101 TFEU and/or Chapter 1 of the Competition 
Act 1998) and the criminal Cartel Offence.78 
 Option 1 received very little support: only Dr Bruce Wardhaugh favoured it, with the 
Confederation of British Industry and the International Chamber of Commerce UK arguing 
that if reform were to occur (which in their opinions it should not) then Option 1 was to be 
SUHIHUUHGWRWKHRWKHURSWLRQV:DUGKDXJKDUJXHVWKDWWKHDGYDQWDJHRIWKLVRSWLRQLVWKDWµLW
clearly specifies that certain agUHHPHQWVDUHQHYHUSHUPLVVLEOHDQGDUHDOZD\VLOOHJDO¶DQGWKDW
UHO\LQJ XSRQ SURVHFXWRULDO JXLGHOLQHV µSURYLGHV OHJDO FHUWDLQW\ ZKLFK KDV LPSRUWDQW
FRQVLGHUDWLRQV ZKHQ YLHZHG IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI WKH UXOH RI ODZ¶79 This argument is 
difficult to support however, in particular because Article 7 ECHR is likely to be violated if 
individuals cannot predetermine from the wording of the offence (including its interpretation 
by the courts) whether their contemplated (cartel) conduct would be criminal in nature if it 
were to be engaged in:80 in short, the use of Option 1 does little to resolve the legal certainty 
problem noted above. Likewise, Option 2 was not favourably received; only one response 
                                                 
Association Section of Antitrust Law and Section of InteUQDWLRQDO/DZRQ³$&RPSHWLWLRQ5HJLPHIRU*URZWK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advocated it, namely that co-authored by Professor Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua. As 
QRWHGE\%,6LWZDVJHQHUDOO\DQGLWLVVXEPLWWHGFRUUHFWO\IHOWWKDW2SWLRQZRXOGµUHVXOW
in an offence that was narrower than it need be, that it could give rise to interpretational 
difficulties, and it would risk not adequately differentiating that offence from the civil antitrust 
SURKLELWLRQV¶81 Moreover, it was felt that pursuing such an option would also be inconsistent 
ZLWKWKHUHFHQWWUHQGIRU(8FRPSHWLWLRQODZWRPRYHDZD\IURPµZKLWHOLVWV¶RIDFFHSWDEOH
agreements (eg, in the context of block exemption regulations implementing Article 101(3) 
TFEU).82 Option 3 was supported by only five respondents (two of whom did so as the least 
XQGHVLUDEOHDOWHUQDWLYHWRWKHUHPRYDORIµGLVKRQHVW\¶$QLPSRUWDQWDGYDQWDJHQRWHd was the 
fact that the requirement to prove secrecy in this context could be used to express the inherent 
moral wrongfulness of the criminal activity in a manner that is easier to understand than is the 
FDVHZKHQµGLVKRQHVW\¶LVUHOLHGXSRQ83 That said, it was convincingly argued that Option 3 
suffers from a significant drawback, in that it increases the (already significant) burden facing 
SURVHFXWRUVKDUGFRUHFDUWHOVµEHLQJKLJKO\XQODZIXOWHQGWREHFRQGXFted extremely covertly, 
but [cartelists] may not always take steps to conceal behaviour that can readily be characterised 
DV³DFWLYH´DQGHYHQZKHUHVXFKVWHSVDUHWDNHQWKHLUYHU\FRYHUWQHVVPD\PHDQWKDWHYLGHQFH
RI WKHP LV KDUG WR XQFRYHU¶84 Finally, as noted above, Option 4 only had a handful of 
supporters. Notable objections to Option 4 were that it would potentially capture legitimate 
horizontal agreements (such as specialisation or joint venture agreements) if they were not 
made openly and that it would create tensions with (legitimate) commercial confidentiality.85 
Some expressed concerns about how the carve out of agreements made openly would operate 
LQSUDFWLFHHJKRZµRSHQO\¶ZRXOGEHGHILQHG86 By contrast, those who supported Option 4 
did so on the basis, inter aliaWKDWLWZRXOGµKHOSWo ensure a ready means of distinguishing the 
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cartel offence from Article 101 [TFEU], such that criminal cases could be pursued whether or 
QRWWKHUHZHUHSDUDOOHO(8FLYLOSURFHHGLQJV¶87 
 After considering the responses, in March 2012, BIS decided to advocate a revised 
version of Option 4. In particular it decided to 
 
UHPRYHWKHµGLVKRQHVW\¶ element from the offence and define the offence so that it does not 
include cartel arrangements that the parties have agreed to publish in a suitable format before 
they are implemented, so that customers and others are aware of them.88 
 
BIS acknowledged that it would be necessary to specify the format for publication at a later 
date, adding that the London Gazette (or a similar publication) could be used for this purpose, 
SDUWLFXODUO\ JLYHQ WKDW LW ZRXOG EH µDQ REMHFWLYHO\ PHDVXUDEOH¶ PHWKRG WR GHWHUPLQH LI the 
SXEOLFDWLRQµFDUYHRXW¶DSSOLHGWRDJLYHQDJUHHPHQW89 )RULWWKHµFDUYHRXW¶ZRXOGQRWRQO\
achieve the objectives of the consultation, but it would do so in a manner that would not overly 
burden business actors. More specifically, in response to the above-criticisms, BIS noted that: 
(i) while businesses certainly need to protect commercial confidentiality when it is legitimate 
WRGRVRFDUWHODUUDQJHPHQWVDUHXQODZIXODQGWKHUHIRUHµLQIRUPDWLRQDVWRWKHLUH[LVWHQFHLV
not legitimately susceptible WRSURWHFWLRQRQWKHJURXQGVRIFRPPHUFLDOFRQILGHQWLDOLW\¶90 and 
(ii) in those rare cases where cartel arrangements would fall within the scope of the Cartel 
Offence but would benefit from an exemption from any administrative prohibition due to their 
net EHQHILFLDOHIIHFWIRUFRQVXPHUVLWLVµQRWXQUHDVRQDEOHWRUHTXLUHWKHGLVFORVXUHRIWKRVH
provisions so as to bring them outside the scope of the offence (other elements of the 
DUUDQJHPHQWVFRXOGUHPDLQFRQILGHQWLDO¶91 
 %,6¶VSXEOLFDWLRQRILWV)LQDO5Hport was swiftly followed by legislative action.92 The 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill, a bill which contained inter alia %,6¶V SURSRVDO
concerning the reform of the Cartel Offence, had its first reading in the House of Commons on 
23 May 2012. This Bill eventually received Royal Assent on 25 April 2013 and became the 
(QWHUSULVHDQG5HJXODWRU\5HIRUP$FWµ(55$¶%\WKDWVWDJHDJDLQVWWKHEDFNGURSRI
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a relatively moderate amount of debate on the issues in both Houses of Parliament, the 
provisions concerning the Cartel Offence had undergone considerable change. The 
µGLVKRQHVW\¶ HOHPHQW ZDV LQGHHG WR EH UHPRYHG section 47(2) ERRA), but two additional 
(notification-W\SHµFDUYHRXWV¶ZHUHDGGHGWRWKHSXEOLFDWLRQµFDUYHRXW¶DGYRFDWHGE\%,6LQ
its Final Report. Consequently, under section 47(5) ERRA (which creates section 188A EA), 
the following are deemed to be circumstances in which the Cartel Offence is not committed: 
 
(a) in a case where the arrangements would (operating as the parties intend) affect the supply 
in the United Kingdom of a product or service, customers would be given relevant information 
about the arrangements before they enter into agreements for the supply to them of the product 
or service so affected, 
(b) in the case of bid-rigging arrangements, the person requesting bids would be given relevant 
information about them at or before the time when a bid is made, or 
(c) in any case, relevant information about the arrangements would be published, before the 
arrangements are implemented, in the manner specified at the time of the making of the 
agreement in an order made by the Secretary of State. 
 
7KHµUHOHYDQWLQIRUPDWLRQ¶DWLVVXHPHDQVWKHQDPHVRIWKHXQGHUWDNLQJVLQYROYHGDGHVFULSWLRQ
of the nature of the arrangement which would explain why they might be arrangements subject 
to the Cartel Offence, the products or services in question, and other information as may be 
specified in an order made by the Secretary of State.93 A novel development, and one which 
received practically no analysis in the Parliamentary debates, was the inclusion within ERRA 
of section 47(6), a section which provides three new defences to the commission of the Cartel 
Offence (by creating section 188B EA). These defences are articulated as follows: 
 
(1) In a case where the arrangements would (operating as the parties intend) affect the supply 
in the United Kingdom of a product or service, it is a defence for an individual charged with 
an offence under section 188(1) [EA] to show that at the time of the making of the agreement, 
he or she did not intend that the nature of the arrangements would be concealed from customers 
at all times before they enter into agreements for the supply to them of the product or service. 
(2) It is a defence for an individual charged with an offence under section 188(1) [EA] to show 
that, at the time of the making of the agreement, he or she did not intend that the nature of the 
arrangements would be concealed from the CMA [Competition and Markets Authority]. 
(3) It is a defence for an individual charged with an offence under section 188(1) [EA] to show 
that, before the making of the agreement, he or she took reasonable steps to ensure that the 
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nature of the arrangements would be disclosed to professional legal advisers for the purposes 
of obtaining advice about them before their making or (as the case may be) their 
implementation. 
 
The ERRA, in section 47(7), also provided that the CMA must prepare and publish guidance 
RQµWKHSULQFLSOHVWREHDSSOLHG¶LQFRPLQJWRDGHFLVLRQZKHWKHUWR prosecute an individual for 
commission of the Cartel Offence. Following a short consultation on this issue initiated in 
September 2013,94 the CMA duly published such guidance.95 
 Section 47 ERRA came into force fully on 1 April 2014, following the making of an 
order to that effect by the Secretary of State.96 On that date an additional order of the Secretary 
RI6WDWHDOVRFDPHLQWRHIIHFWZKLFKSURYLGHGWKDWIRUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHSXEOLFDWLRQµFDUYH
RXW¶ SURYLGHG LQ section 47(5) ERRA, µUHOHYDQW LQIRUPDWLRQ about the arrangements is 
published if it is advertised once in either the London Gazette, the Edinburgh Gazette or the 
%HOIDVW*D]HWWH¶97 At the time of writing, the CMA has yet to charge anyone under the new 
provisions relating to the UK Cartel Offence implemented by virtue of section 47 ERRA.98 
 
CRITICALLY ANALYSING THE REFORMS IN SECTION 47 ERRA 
 
5HPRYDORIµ'LVKRQHVW\¶DQGWKH3RWHQWLDOIRUµ2YHUFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ 
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It was noted above that a serious inherent defect of the original Cartel Offence was its 
UHTXLUHPHQW WR SURYH µGLVKRQHVW\¶ RQ EHKDOI RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO FDUWHOLVW LQ RUGHU WR VHFXUH
successful prosecutions. It is submitted therefore that sHFWLRQ  (55$¶V DEolition of the 
µGLVKRQHVW\¶HOHPHQW IURPWKH&DUWHO2IIHQFHVKRXOGEHZHOFRPHG LW UHPRYHV WKH LQKHUHQW
defect and the difficulties it can engender. Admittedly such a position is in conflict with the 
µZDLW DQG VHH¶SRVLWLRQDGRSWHGE\ WKHYDVWPDMRULW\RI WKH UHOHYDQW UHVSRQGHQWV WR%,6¶V
Consultation Document; however, as is evident from the analyses above, this position is 
supportable on the basis of theoretical, legal and empirical arguments. None of this is to say, 
however, that by merely removing µGLVKRQHVW\¶RQH WKHUHE\ UHVROYHV WKHSUREOHPVZLWK WKH
&DUWHO2IIHQFH,QIDFWWKHUHPRYDORIµGLVKRQHVW\¶EULQJVZLWKLWDVHULRXVDGGLWLRQDOSUREOHP
that needs to be overcome: the potential engendering of the phenomenon of 
µRYHUFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶99 where the Cartel Offence no longer aligns itself expressly with 
culpable or morally wrongful conduct. 
 While there are of course morally-neutral/-ambiguous offences,100 it does not 
necessarily follow that morality is no longer a concern for those who advocate criminalising a 
given behaviour, including cartel activity.101 Of continuing importance is the question whether 
the criminal law should extend beyond its traditional conception of criminality and concern 
itself with conduct which does not attract the unequivocal moral opprobrium of the community. 
For some, applying the criminal law to morally-neutral/-ambiguous conduct is not only unjust 
but is also counterproductive, in that by unfairly labelling offenders as criminals, the moral 
authority of the law is undermined, resulting as a consequence in a weakening of the deterrent 
value of criminal sanctions.102 )RUWKH/DZ&RPPLVVLRQIRUH[DPSOHµFULPLQDO ODZVKRXOG
only be employed to deal with wrongdoers who deserve the stigma associated with criminal 
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conviction becaXVHWKH\KDYHHQJDJHGLQVHULRXVO\UHSUHKHQVLEOHFRQGXFW¶103 Ashworth argues 
DVLPLODUSRLQWZKHQKHSRVLWVWKDWWKHµFHQWUDOIXQFWLRQ¶RIWKHFULPLQDOODZLQYROYHVWKHµD
the declaration of forms of wrongdoing that are (b) serious enough to justify (c) the public 
FHQVXUHLQKHUHQWLQFRQYLFWLRQDQGGSXQLVKPHQW¶104 Some even contend that applying the 
criminal sanction to morally-neutraO FRQGXFW LQ IDFW µGHFULPLQDOLVHV¶ WKH FULPLQDO ODZ DQG
taken to its extreme either results in nullification or, more subWO\ D FKDQJLQJ RI SHRSOH¶V
attitudes towards the meaning of criminality.105 For them, the criminal law should be concerned 
solely with conduct which unequivocally attracts the moral opprobrium of society; it should in 
RWKHUZRUGVFRQFHQWUDWHRQµWUDGLWLRQDO¶FULPHVDQGQRWPRUDOO\-neutral conduct.106 They argue 
that, in the absence of such a restraint, the criminal law may begin to lose its legitimacy.107  
 Admittedly such arguments do not entertain the possibility that by criminalising cartel 
activity one may influence others as to how they perceive the nature of that behaviour;108 they 
ignore the educative function of the criminal law. More specifically, they do not allow for the 
criminal law actually to create, and not just reflect, a moral opprobrium for what is, at least 
according to those who legislate, undesirable behaviour, albeit behaviour failing somewhat 
VKRUWRIµLPPRUDO¶DFFRUGLQJWRDVLJQLILFDQWSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ,WLVGLIILFXOWWRGHQ\
that there is some reciprocal relationship between thHFRQWHQWRIWKHFULPLQDOODZDQGVRFLHW\¶V
perception of the morality of the conduct it regulates.109 According to Coffee, the line between 
malum in se and malum prohibitum has been crossed many times and has largely been 
GLVFUHGLWHGʊSDUWLFXODUO\LQWKHIield of white-FROODUFULPHʊDQGLQIDFWWKHSXEOLFOHDUQVD
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significant deal of its morality from what is punished by the criminal law.110 That said, although 
not all criminal offences involve intrinsic moral wrongs, the more negative that conduct is in 
terms of its moral qualities, the likelier it will be appreciated as undesirable conduct requiring 
criminal sanctions,111 and the easier it would be to employ the educative function of the 
criminal law, particularly if attitudes have been hardened by an already-existing civil 
enforcement regime. Even further, a number of important advantages can be achieved if a cartel 
offence relates to conduct which is morally questionable, advantages which may be lost if 
morality is overlooked, such as a reduction in enforcement costs due to an internalisation of 
the moral norm.112 ,QGHHGµ>V@RFLDOQRUPVRSSRVLQJFDUWHOVKDYHWKHSRWHQWLDOWRFRPSOHPHQW
VDQFWLRQVDQGHQFRXUDJHGHVLVWHQFH¶113 A disconnect between morally wrongful behaviour and 
the content of a cartel offence may therefore increase the probability of a negative outcome, 
such as nullification or a change of attitudes towards the nature and fairness of the criminal 
law. In fact, some believe that the success of a project of cartel criminalisation µGHSHQGVRQWKH
HPHUJHQFHRIDJHQXLQHVHQVHRI³KDUGFRUH´GHOLQTXHQF\ZLWKRXWZKLFKHIIHFWLYHUHJXODWLRQ
E\PHDQVRIFULPLQDOODZLVXQOLNHO\WREHDFKLHYHG¶114 In order to avoid undesirable outcomes 
with the creation of a cartel offence (which does not contain an explicit moral concept at its 
KHDUW VXFK DV µGLVKRQHVW\¶, one should therefore attempt to ensure that such an offence 
inherently captures some form of culpable or morally wrongful behaviour. 
 
Rationalising the µCarve Outs¶: the Concept of Deception 
 
,WLVVXEPLWWHGWKDWRQHRIWKHPDMRUDGYDQWDJHVRIWKHQRWLILFDWLRQDQGSXEOLFDWLRQµFDUYHRXWV¶
in sHFWLRQ(55$LVWKHLUDELOLW\WRSURYLGHDVRUWRIµURXJKFXW¶EHWZHHQFDUWHODFWLYLW\
caught by the (reformed) UK Cartel Offence and morally wrongful behaviour. The point to be 
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understood is that ERWK WKHQRWLILFDWLRQDQGSXEOLFDWLRQ µFDUYHRXWV¶FDQEH LQWHUSUHWHGDV D
(relatively successful) attempt to align cartel conduct caught by the Cartel Offence with a 
violation of the moral norm against deception. The reasons for this are: (i) that, with certain 
exceptions, cartel activity usually involves deception; and (ii) WKDWWKHµFDUYHRXWV¶UHSUHVHQW
the obvious exceptions (i.e., those cartel situations where deception is clearly not present).115 
By (re)designing the Cartel Offence in this way, the legislature has reduced the potential for 
that offence WRFRQWULEXWHWRµRYHUFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶LQWKe UK and to the problems that such a 
phenomenon can engender. In order to appreciate how this is the case, one first needs to 
understand how cartel activity can (and sometimes cannot) align itself with the moral norm 
against deception. 
Deception occurs where (i) a message is communicated, with (ii) an intent to cause a 
person to believe something that is untrue and (iii) a person is thereby caused to believe 
something that is not true.116 There are two scenarios involving the interaction of a cartelist 
with her customer which arguably involve deception: (i) where the cartelist expressly states to 
her customer that she has not colluded; and (ii) where the cartelist does not expressly state that 
cartelisation has (or has not) occurred but nonetheless fails to disclose its occurrence to its 
customer. A third scenario can be added concerning cartel activity: where the cartelist expressly 
discloses the existence of the cartel prior to implementing it, so that customers are actually or 
constructively aware of the cartel. It is argued below that (a) the third scenario does not involve 
deception and (b) to ensure that the criminal cartel offence only captures deceptive cartel 
DFWLYLW\LWZRXOGEHQHFHVVDU\WRµFDUYHRXW¶WKHWKLUGVFHQDULRIURPWKHFULPLQDOFDUWHORIIHQFH. 
The first scenario identified directly above involves the communicated PHVVDJHµ,KDYH
QRW HQJDJHG LQ FDUWHO DFWLYLW\¶, which is a verifiable assertion that is literally false.117 The 
actual message intended to be communicated, then, is a lie. The process by which this 
communicated message leads to a false belief on the behalf of a third party (ie, that cartel 
DFWLYLW\ KDV QRW RFFXUUHG LQYROYHV WKH UHOLDQFH E\ WKH WKLUG SDUW\ XSRQ RQH RI WKH µFRUH
FRQYHQWLRQVRIGLDORJXH¶WKHFRQYHQWLRQWKDWµSRVLWLYHDssertions of fact are true in the ordinary 
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VHQVH RI WKH ZRUGV XVHG¶118 Furthermore it is not difficult to argue that, absent a genuine 
mistake on the part of the cartelist, her ultimate objective in communicating is to mislead the 
customer. There are certainly incentives for the cartelist to so mislead. Customers are less likely 
WRGLVSOD\µEDGIHHOLQJV¶DERXWWKHSULFHULVHDQGDUHWKHUHIRUHOHVVOLNHO\WRVHHNDOWHUQDWLYH
suppliers) if they attribute the price rise to cost increases rather than to collusion; and due to 
WKHLULJQRUDQFHRIWKHFDUWHO¶VH[LVWHQFHFXVWRPHUVZLOOQRWUHSRUWWKHFDUWHOWRWKHDXWKRULWLHV
One must not forget here that cartel activity is unlawful after all and, if detected, will result in 
the imposition of significant fines. It should thus be no surprise that, according to the 
&RPPLVVLRQDWOHDVWµWKHXQGHUWDNLQJVLQYROYHGLQWKHJUDYHVWDQWLWUXVWLQIULQJHPHQWVusually 
HPSOR\HIIRUWV DQG VRPHWLPHV VRSKLVWLFDWHGPHDQV WR FRQFHDO WKHLU LOOHJDO FRQGXFW¶119 The 
General Court agrees with this assessment.120 With express statements, then, the criteria 
concerning deception can be fulfilled relatively easily. But while the first scenario may indeed 
involve deception, it is unlikely to occur in practice: cases where cartelists provide statements 
VXFKDVµQRQHHGWRZRUU\RXUSULFHVKDYHQRWEHHQGHWHUPLQHGE\FROOXVLRQ¶ZLOOEHUDUH121 A 
possible exception may be where official statements concerning the absence of collusion when 
preparing tenders are provided to secure government procurement contracts.122 
The second scenario is more common in the real world however. The message 
communicated by a cartelist when active in a market is that her (cartelised) goods/services are 
available for sale. This message is a literal truth: the goods are indeed for sale. This is not a 
problem though, as literally true statements are capable of being deceptive.123 What is required 
is that the message communicated leads to a false belief. The false belief is that cartel activity 
has not occurred; it is created due to an assumption made by third parties as a result of the 
communication of the original message. The assumption is that the cartelist is lawfully engaged 
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in normal competition with her competitors. By placing her (cartelised) good on the market 
and by keeping the cartel secret, the cartelist implies that she has not actually cartelised: 
 
in many situations today third parties who deal with undertakings that are in fact parties to cartel 
agreements will proceed on the assumption that they are dealing with undertakings that are 
lawfully engaged in normal competition with each other; and the cartelists will know that that 
LV VR DQG ZLOO LQ HIIHFW DFW LQ D GLVKRQHVW « PDQQHU LI WKH H[LVWHQFHRI WKH FDUWHO LV NHSW
secret.124 
 
This argument was accepted by the High Court when it ruled that cartel activity per se, that is 
without aggravating features such as express lies, could be a dishonest practice in law.125 While 
the argument was rejected on appeal,126 it was rejected due to legal precedent and not because 
the moral concept of µdishonesty¶, or indeed deception, was incapable of accommodating cartel 
activity.127 
 As noted above, there is one more potential interaction between a cartelist and her 
customer that is relevant to the assessment of deception, an interaction that rationalises the 
H[LVWHQFHRIWKHQRWLILFDWLRQDQGSXEOLFDWLRQµFDUYHRXWV¶ZKHUHWKHFDUWHOLVWexpressly states to 
her customer that she has colluded. When this interaction occurs, there will be no deception; 
the cartelist is merely telling the truth. Indeed, the admission effectively ensures that the 
customer is made aware of the cartel: presumably, the customer would not be led to believe by 
such an admission that in fact no cartel exists. If there is an admission of the existence of a 
cartel prior to a sale (either through public publication (of which customers could be deemed 
to have constructive notice) or direct communication with potential customers), then, there is 
no violation of the moral norm against deception. While this assertion may represent a 
VWDWHPHQWRIWKHREYLRXVLWQRQHWKHOHVVSURYLGHVDVROLGUHDVRQIRUWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKHµFDUYH
RXWV¶WKe desire to align the Cartel Offence with the moral norm against deception. In short, if 
RQHLVVZD\HGE\WKHDUJXPHQWVFRQFHUQLQJSRWHQWLDOµRYHUFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶WKHQRQHFDQWDNH
FRPIRUWLQWKHIDFWWKDWµFDUYHRXWV¶KHOSWRXQGHUPLQHWKHLUSRWHQF\ 
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Rationalising the µCarve Outs¶WKH&RQFHSWRIµ/HJLWLPDWH¶&DUWHO$FWLYLW\ 
 
$QDGGLWLRQDODQGHTXDOO\LPSRUWDQWDGYDQWDJHRIWKHµFDUYHRXWV¶LVWKHIDFWWKDWWKH\DOORZ
for a satisfactory resolution of the difficult issue of avoiding the criminalisation RIµOHJLWLPDWH¶
cartel activity (ie, the (rare) type of cartel activity that is exempt from (administrative/civil) 
prohibition and punishment). First, one should understand that a criminal cartel offence that 
prohibits price-fixing, output restrictions, market sharing and bid-rigging while allowing for a 
µFDUYHRXW¶RIQRWLILHGSXEOLVKHGDJUHHPHQWVZRXOGQRWUHTXLUHDGHFLVLRQ-maker to assess the 
economic effects of an agreement to find that the offence has been committed. In short, the 
µFDUYHRXWV¶DYRLGWhe presentation of complex economic evidence in a trial, and therefore the 
SUREOHPVWKDWVXFKSUHVHQWDWLRQHQWDLOV+RZHYHUDQGLPSRUWDQWO\WKHµFDUYHRXWV¶FDQDOVR
indirectly provide immunity from criminal sanctions for those who conclude agreements that 
would benefit from an exception under Article 101(3) TFEU or section 9 of the Competition 
Act 1998. If cartelists genuinely believe that their cartel agreement would benefit from a 
(civil/administrative) exception (as it would fulfil the relevant legal criteria), all they have to 
do to avoid criminal sanctions is to publish publicly the agreement prior to its implementation 
or to notify the customers prior to their entry into the relevant contracts. Accordingly, no 
economic evidence needs to be presented to a jury for an Article 101(3)-type exception to be 
operationalised. What is necessary is that before coming to any agreement the cartelists analyse 
the agreement contemplated and make their decision (based on legal advice if necessary) 
whether an exemption would be available under the administrative offences. If so, and they 
wish to conclude and to implement the agreement, they should publish the agreement (prior to 
implementation) or give customers information about the agreement (prior to contracting) to 
avoid criminal sanctions. If they are correct in their economic analyses, then the undertakings 
for whom they work will also avoid administrative sanctions, such as fines. If the rules of 
8.(8 FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZ ZRXOG QRW GHHP WKH FDUWHO WR EH µDFFHSWDEOH¶ FDUWHO DFWLYLW\ WKH
cartelists can then decide: (i) to conclude and publish the agreement (in the process subjecting 
the cartel to possible civil competition law enforcement, but avoiding criminal liability for 
themselves); (ii) to conclude and then implement the agreement without publishing it or 
informing customers directly (subjecting themselves to possible criminal liability); or (iii) to 
abandon their attempts to reach agreement altogether so that criminal and/or administrative 
sanctions will not result. 
&ULWLFVPLJKWVD\WKDWFDUWHOLVWVZLOOµVKRUWFLUFXLW¶WKH8.FULPLQDODQWLWUXVWUHJLPHE\
routinely making public all of their cartel agreements, thereby nullifying the deterrent effect of 
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the criminal cartel sanctions. This is unlikely as presumably the cartelist wishes to see the cartel 
actually work in practice (and not receive fines and/or the negative publicity that would 
presumably follow). If so, they would be reluctant to bring the cartel to the attention of those 
who enforce the administrative cartel prohibitions.  However, if (in the very unlikely case that) 
cartelists do decide to make their (clearly unlawful) agreement public merely to avoid criminal 
sanctions, the following positive effect would register: the veil of secrecy surrounding the cartel 
would be pierced, thereby increasing the rate of detection of unlawful cartels for the purposes 
of the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU or Chapter 1 of the Competition Act 1998 (and with 
it the deterrent effect of the administrative offence). This increase in the rate of detection (if it 
were to occur) would undermine the need for criminal sanctions to deter cartel activity in the 
first place (as the optimal fine would be reduced significantly).128 +HQFHWKHµVKRUWFLUFXLWLQJ¶
if it were to occur (which, again, is unlikely anyway) would not be overly problematic. 
Three SRWHQWLDO LVVXHV FRXOG EH UDLVHG ZLWK WKH µFDUYH RXWV¶ 7KH ILUVW FRQFHUQV
legitimate commercial confidentiality and its undermining by the requirement to notify 
customers or publicise WKH DJUHHPHQW ,W LV VXEPLWWHG WKDW %,6¶V UHVSRQVH RQ WKLV LVVXH LV
satisfactory:129 given the important public interest in suppressing hard core cartel activity, it is 
not unreasonable to expect business people to provide (very) limited details regarding certain 
agreements in those rare instances where cartel activity can be understood as being beneficial 
for consumers. The second issue is that the parties to a cartel may wish to publish an 
(innocuous) agreement between them in order to obscure collusive behaviour that is more 
problematic under the EU competition law rules. Indeed, there are a number of EU competition 
cases where legitimate cooperative behaviour was employed as a screen for more problematic, 
anticompetitive conduct. One recent example is the EPEX/Nord Pool cartel, where the parties, 
in the (legitimate) context of exploring a joint approach concerning the technical systems to be 
employed in cross-border trade, agreed not to compete with one another and allocated EU 
markets between them.130 It is submitted here however that this issue is not something about 
which to be anxious. It all FRPHVGRZQWRWKHVFRSHRIWKHµFDUYHRXW¶If WKHµFDUYHRXW¶LVWR
apply at all it will only apply to the published/notified agreement itself; other agreements 
between the parties remain unaffected. Where one (legitimate) agreement is published/notified 
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to obscure the existence of another (unlawful) agreement, the situation is clear: the (unlawful) 
cartel agreement that the (published/notified) agreement attempts WRµVKLHOG¶UHPDLQVH[SRVHG
to criminal sanctions. The parties may argue, however, that the two agreements in that instance 
(the legitimate and the unlawful) in fact together form one µoverall agreement¶ between them 
and that this µRYHUDOODJUHHPHQW¶has been published/notified. In doing so, they will hope to 
rely upon the publication/notification of the legitimate aspect of the alleged µoverall DJUHHPHQW¶
to apply to the agreement as a whole. Importantly, tKLVVRUWRIWDFWLFDOXVHRIWKHµFDUYHRXWV¶ 
would EHXQVXFFHVVIXO7KHUHDVRQLVWKDWIRUDµFDUYHRXW¶WREHDSSOLFDEOHWKHSDUWLHVPXVW
provide (via publication or notification) a description of the nature of the arrangement which 
would explain why they might be arrangements subject to the Cartel Offence. By failing to 
disclose the existence of the unlawful aspect of the alleged µRYHUDOO DJUHHPHQW¶ WKHSDUWLHV
ZRXOG EH IDLOLQJ WR SURYLGH WKLV LQIRUPDWLRQ &RQVHTXHQWO\ D µFDUYH RXW¶ IRU WKH DOOHJHG
µoverall DJUHHPHQW¶ZRXOGQRWEHSURYLGHGIn any case, the ability to apply administrative (EU 
or national) competition law sanctions would be untouched by any publication/notification, 
and so no negative impact upon the administrative competition law regime would result due to 
the existence of thHµFDUYHRXWV¶. In the worst case scenario, then, WKHµFDUYHRXWV¶ZRXOGQHLWKHU
help nor hinder the competition authorities in dealing with the sorts of cartels where legitimate 
cooperative behaviour is employed as a screen for more problematic, anticompetitive conduct. 
The thirG LVVXH LV WKDW WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ µFDUYH RXW¶ DSSURDFK WR RSHUDWLRQDOLVLQJ DQ $UWLFOH
101(3)-type exemption from the criminal cartel offence could be interpreted by some as a return 
to the past, where notification of agreements to competition authorities was a pre-requisite to 
the granting of an exemption, a practice that has rightly been criticised as a highly inefficient 
method of dealing with legitimate agreements between competitors.131 It is submitted, 
KRZHYHUWKDWWKHµFDUYHRXW¶RISXEOLVKHGDJUHHPHQWVLVQRWHTXLYDOHQWWRDQRWLILFDWLRQDQG
authorisation regime as it does not require any action on behalf of the competition authorities: 
the mere fact that an agreement has been published in a suitable format automatically removes 
the cartelists from the sphere of criminal law. There is therefore no resultant administrative 
burden on the authority. This is very different to a state of affairs where a ruling by the 
competition authority on the validity of an agreement is actually required in order to provide 
FODULILFDWLRQRIWKHOHJDOVLWXDWLRQ:KDWWKHµFDUYHRXW¶UHDOO\DPRXQWVWRLQSUDFWLFHLVDIRUP
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of criminal immunity that is granted prior to the implementation of a cartel agreement that 
leaves open the possibility of later civil/administrative action by the competition authority.132 
,WLVVXEPLWWHGLQIDFWWKDWVXFKDµFDUYHRXW¶HQJHQGHUVPRUHDGYDQWDJHVWKDQGLVDGYDQWDJHV
and should be an option favoured by those jurisdictions that are serious about dealing with 
hard-core cartel activity but do not wish to prohibit cartel activity that (according to the 
EU/national competition law rules) pursues a legitimate purpose or may produce net benefits 
for consumers. 
 
An Imperfect and Unworkable Reform: the Defence of Legal Advice 
 
UnfRUWXQDWHO\WKHUHIRUPRIWKH&DUWHO2IIHQFHH[WHQGVEH\RQGWKHUHPRYDORIµGLVKRQHVW\¶
DQGWKHSURYLVLRQRIQRWLILFDWLRQDQGSXEOLFDWLRQµFDUYHRXWV¶LQYROYLQJDVLWGRHVWKHFUHDWLRQ
of three novel defences, one of which is particularly troubling for those who wish to see a 
robust criminal cartel regime exist within the UK. The two defences which are not problematic 
are those that, respectively, centre on proof (on the balance of probabilities) that the defendant 
did not intend the nature of the cartel arrangements to be concealed from (a) customers or (b) 
from the CMA.  These defences are unlikely to have a large impact in practice, particularly 
given the fact that they require proof (albeit to lower standard) of a negative. Moreover, both 
normal commercial confidentiality considerations and the absence of a positive obligation to 
disclose horizontal agreements to the CMA make it difficult to determine whether an absence 
of an intention to conceal was present. This fact has led some to conclude that these defences 
KDYHµEHHQGUDIWHGPRUHWRGHILQHVLWXDWLRQVLQZKLFKLWVKRXOGQRWEHDYDLODEOHLHVHFUHWFDUWHOV
WKDQWRSURYLGHDJHQHUDOO\XVHIXOGHIHQFHIRUOHJLWLPDWHFRPPHUFLDODUUDQJHPHQWV¶133 Two 
things can, however, be said in their favour. First, they can be used to ensure that criminal 
sanctions do not attach to those sorts of (cartel) agreements that are beneficial to consumers 
but for which their prior disclosure may be difficult in practice (assuming that such agreements 
actually exist). There does not appear to be a solid consensus on the extent to which such 
agreements may exist in practice, but one potential example has been aired: arrangements for 
the joint underwriting of certain insurance contracts.134 Second, and more importantly, these 
                                                 
132
 See, eg, Warner and Trebilcock, n 63 above, 719. 
133
 6HH%0F*UDWKDQG-/RYH µ$)XUWKHU7ZLVW LQ WKH ³'LVKRQHVW\´7DOH8.*RYHUQPHQW3URSRVHV1HZ
'HIHQFHVWRWKH&ULPLQDO&DUWHO2IIHQFH¶Lexology, 30 October 2012, 3. 
134
 See, eg, the comments of Viscount Younger of Leckie in HL Deb vol 743 col 1057 26 February 2013. 
31 
 
two defHQFHV OLNH WKH QRWLILFDWLRQ DQG SXEOLFDWLRQ µFDUYH RXWV¶ FDQ EH UDWLRQDOLVHG DV DQ
attempt to link (criminalised) cartel activity to deception: an absence of an intention to conceal 
can be interpreted as an absence of an intention to mislead. For those concerned about 
overcriminalisation, these two defences may therefore provide some comfort. 
 The problematic defence is the one (now found in section 188B(3) EA) that requires an 
individual to show (on the balance of probabilities) that, before the making of the agreement, 
she took reasonable steps to ensure that the nature of the arrangements would be disclosed to 
professional legal advisers for the purposes of obtaining advice about them before their making 
or implementation. The reason that it is problematic is that, on its face, this defence allows 
cartelists to escape criminal conviction merely by informing their lawyers of their intended 
cartel plans in order to get their advice regarding their legality. Taken literally, the defence 
does not impose a requirement to follow any legal advice provided, even when that advice 
clearly explains that the proposed conduct would otherwise fall within the scope of the UK 
Cartel Offence; all it seems to require is that reasonable steps are taken to obtain the advice. 
This interpretation is supported by WKH ([SODQDWRU\ 1RWHV DQG WKH &0$¶V 3URVHFXWLRQ
Guidance, both of which are silent regarding any need to take the advice provided.135 
$FFRUGLQJWRWKH&0$IRUWKLVGHIHQFHWREHRSHUDWLYHWKHUHPXVWµJHQXLQHO\EHDQDWWempt 
to seek OHJDODGYLFHDERXWWKHDUUDQJHPHQW¶136 If, then, there is no requirement actually to take 
any (reasonable) legal advice provided then a serious flaw has crept into the reform of the 
&DUWHO2IIHQFHµWKHUHZRXOGDSSHDUWREHQRWKLQJWRSUHYHQWDn executive from seeking such 
advice to cover [her] back, being advised that the conduct [she] proposes is unlawful, and then 
VLPSO\LJQRULQJWKDWDGYLFH¶137 The Cartel Offence, then, may operate in future merely as a 
PHDVXUHWKDWHQVXUHVERWKWKHSD\PHQWRIDVROLFLWRU¶VIHHE\DFDUWHOLVWDQGWKHLQFRQYHQLHQFH
of disclosing to that solicitor her future cartel plans in order to obtain legal advice. If so, this 
would be a rather strange feature of the UK competition regime, particularly given that, in the 
FRQWH[W RI DGPLQLVWUDWLYH FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZ SURFHHGLQJV DJDLQVW XQGHUWDNLQJV µOHJDO DGYLFH
provided to an undertaking cannot form the basis of a legitimate expectation on the part of an 
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undertaking that its conduct does not infringe Article 101 TFEU nor will it give rise to the 
LPSRVLWLRQRIDILQH¶138 even where the advice is erroneous and relied upon in good faith by 
the undertaking. More importantly, the creatLRQRIDµVHHNLQJRIOHJDODGYLFH¶GHIHQFHLVFOHDUO\
an unacceptable development for those who wish to see a real deterrent effect from criminal 
cartel sanctions: prosecutions are unlikely to be forthcoming when a defence can so easily be 
made out. Indeed one commentator has gone so far as to note that this defence represents an 
µDEVXUGLW\¶LQ(QJOLVKODZ139 ZKLOHDQRWKHUFRQWHQGVWKDWLWUHSUHVHQWVLQHIIHFWDµJHWRXWRI
MDLOIUHHFDUG¶IRUFDUWHOLVWVRSHUDWLQJLQWKH8.140 
 One of the central reasons for disappointment is that the defence exists in a context 
where the informed lawyer of the cartelist is under no obligation to inform the authorities about 
the proposed cartel activity of her client: as legal professional privilege receives very strong 
protection in law,141 WKHREOLJDWLRQVWRLQIRUPWKHDXWKRULWLHVDERXWDFOLHQW¶VIXWXUHDFWLYLW\DUH
very narrowly drawn indeed,142 and at present do not expressly or impliedly encompass the 
reporting of cartel activity. One could, in theory, provide (through legislation) an express 
obligation on the informed lawyer to disclose to the authorities the proposed cartel conduct of 
the client. If such an obligation were created and respected by lawyers, this would go some 
way towards rehabilitating the reformed Cartel Offence: while criminal sanctions would not 
attach to the reported cartel activity, the reporting of that activity to the authorities helps to 
pierce the veil of secrecy surrounding cartels, improving the rate of detection of cartels (and 
engendering a more robust administrative enforcement regime), all of which would be to the 
benefit of deterrence, and ultimately to consumer welfare. This type of remedial measure, 
however, would arguably be a step too far, particularly given the importance that is accorded 
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to the concept of legal professional privilege.143 The limited circumstances in which a duty to 
disclose exits invariably involve activity that would be considered inherently immoral and/or 
criminal in nature by the vast majority of citizens (eg, the financing of terrorist operations). It 
is not unlikely that there would be a distinct absence of support for such a measure among the 
legal community, if not wider society.  Of particular concern would be idea that lawyers should 
take on an indirect (civil/administrative) enforcement role regarding cartel activity. Indeed, in 
the context of money laundering and the current obligations imposed upon lawyers to report 
such activity,144 FRQFHUQKDVEHHQYRLFHGDERXWODZ\HUV¶EHLQJXVHGWRµSROLFH¶WKHHQIRUFHPHQW
of a given law.145 In addition, and on a practical note, one should understand that the legal 
DGYLFHGHIHQFHPD\EHIXOILOOHGZKHQWKHµSURIHVVLRQDOOHJDODGYLVHU¶LVDIRUHLJQLHQRQ-UK) 
lawyer. While the ERRA is silent again on this issue, the CMA has noted the following: the 
WHUPµLVLQWHQGHGWRFRYHU both external and in-house legal advisers qualified in the UK¶ and 
µLWcould also apply to legal advisers qualified in foreign jurisdictions with an equivalent legal 
TXDOLILFDWLRQ¶146 If foreign lawyers can qualify DVµSURIHVVLRQDOOHJDODGYLVHUV¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHV
of the defence, then it could prove difficult to ensure the workability of the duty to disclose in 
SUDFWLFHLQIRUPHGFDUWHOLVWVPD\JHWOHJDODGYLFHDEURDGLQRUGHUWRDYRLGWKHLUODZ\HUV¶KDYLQJ
to disclose any proposed cartel. For the above reasons, then, the creation of a duty to disclose 
proposed cartel activity should not be advocated. 
 $QDOWHUQDWLYHPHWKRGRIGHDOLQJZLWK WKH LGHQWLILHGGHILFLHQF\ LQ WKHµOHJDODGYLFH¶
defence is to read additional ZRUGVLQWRWKHGHIHQFHDORQJWKHOLQHVRIµ«DQGPXVWKDYHWDNHQ
UHDVRQDEOHVWHSVWRFRPSO\ZLWKDFWRQWKDWDGYLFH¶147 The argument here would be that, if 
those lines are not read into the relevant provision (section 188B(3) EA), then that provision 
becomes irreconcilable with the rest of the statutory provision providing criminal cartel 
sanctions (ie, section 188 EA): section 188 EA is designed to deter cartel activity; but section 
%($ UHDG OLWHUDOO\ LV DQ µDEVXUGLW\¶ DV LW HQVXUHV LQ HIIHFW WKDW deterrence will not 
occur. It has been argued that judicial support for a reading into the defence of those lines could 
potentially be found in a number of English cases where a purposive approach to statutory 
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interpretation is adopted.148 Cases noted in this context include: R. v Allen,149 Re Sigsworth,150 
Keene v Muncaster,151 and Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.152 It is submitted, however, that 
such an approach, while arguably possible, is overly optimistic as it depends upon a receptive 
judiciary that is prepared to read words into a statute when there is no expressed or implied 
intention on the part of Parliament to have the provision understood in that fashion. Nowhere 
in Hansard, or anywhere else for that matter, is there an expression on behalf of Parliament that 
the legal advice defence should operate in any other way than the literal interpretation of section 
188B(3) EA would warrant. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to argue successfully in court 
that words should be read into a statute: 
 
[t]he power to add to, alter or ignore statutory words is an extremely limited one. Generally 
speaking, it can only be exercised when there has been a demonstrable mistake on the part of 
the drafter or where the consequence of applying the words in their ordinary, or discernible 
secondary, meaning would be utterly unreasonable. Even then the mistake may be thought to 
be beyond correction by the court.153 
 
*LYHQWKLVFRQWH[WWRUHPHG\WKHLGHQWLILHGµIODZ¶LQWKHUHIRUPHG&DUWHO2IIHQFHLWZRXOGEH
advisable for Parliament to abolish sHFWLRQ % ($ ,PSRUWDQWO\ WKH µOHJDO DGYLFH¶
GHIHQFH¶VDVVXPHGREMHFWLYHRISURYLGLQJDVDIHKDUERXUIRUµOHJLWLPDWH¶FDUWHODFWLYLW\FDQEH
DFKLHYHGVDWLVIDFWRULO\WKURXJKWKHQRWLILFDWLRQDQGSXEOLFDWLRQµFDUYHRXWV¶DQGWKHRWKHU two 
defences, as argued above. In fact, the defence offers very little to the successful operation of 
a criminal cartel regime except its ability to undermine the capability of antitrust enforcers to 
obtain successful prosecutions in practice. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
On 1 April 2014, section 47 ERRA entered into force, ensuring significant changes to the 
criminal UK Cartel Offence. As a result of section 47 ERRA, the (controversial) definitional 
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HOHPHQWRIµGLVKRQHVW\¶KDVEHHQUHPRYHGIURPWKHRIIHQFHDQXPEHURIµFDUYHRXWV¶IURPWKH
offence have been created, and three additional defences now exist. It was argued above that, 
for various (theoretLFDOOHJDODQGSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQVWKHUHPRYDORIWKHµGLVKRQHVW\¶HOHPHQW
should be welcomed. However, mere removal of that particular element arguably fosters a 
criminal cartel offence which does not necessarily encompass morally reprehensible behaviour; 
LQ VKRUW LW ZRXOG HQJHQGHU D SRWHQWLDO µRYHUFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ¶ LVVXH )RU WKLV UHDVRQ WKH
QRWLILFDWLRQDQGSXEOLFDWLRQµFDUYHRXWV¶LQsection 47 ERRA should also be welcomed: they 
represent a (largely successful) attempt to align the conduct captured by section 188 EA with 
conduct that violates one of the accepted norms in British society, namely the norm against 
GHFHSWLRQ ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKRVH SDUWLFXODU µFDUYH RXWV¶ DOVR SURYLGH DQ HIIHFWLYH ZD\ RI
RSHUDWLRQDOLVLQJ DQ H[HPSWLRQ IRU µOHJLWLPDWH¶ FDUWHO DFtivity, without the need for the 
presentation of complex economic evidence in a criminal trial (with a (non-specialised) jury), 
LQ WKH SURFHVV HQVXULQJ WKDW WKH &DUWHO 2IIHQFH GRHV QRW µFKLOO¶ DQ\ KRUL]RQWDO FRRSHUDWLRQ
between competitors that is beneficial to consumers.  
It is submitted that if the reform of the Cartel Offence were to have stopped there, it 
would have provided the UK authorities with a workable criminal cartel offence. 
Unfortunately, in an apparent effort to reassure those worried about legislative overreach, the 
British legislators also introduced a problematic defence that has the real potential to undermine 
the effective operation of the UK Cartel Offence: section 188B(3) EA. That defence, focused 
as it is on the seeking of legal advice, provides remarkably easy cover for those who wish to 
engage in cartel activity (contrary to the interests of consumers) without worrying about 
exposure to a later criminal prosecution. It is the contention of this author that the provision of 
this new defence was a mistake in principle. The UK Government would be well advised to 
remove this defence from the statute books if it wishes to have in place a robust and effective 
anti-cartel enforcement regime within its jurisdiction. 
 
